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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This matter comes on before this court on appeal from an 
order for summary judgment in this action challenging 
certain academic requirements for participation in varsity 
athletics promulgated by the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association ("NCAA"). See Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F. Supp.2d 
687 (E.D. Pa. 1999). In particular, the plaintiffs challenge 
the minimum Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT") score 
requirement for freshman-year varsity intercollegiate 
athletic participation. While the NCAA also has adopted 
minimum grade point average ("GPA") requirements, the 
plaintiffs do not challenge them directly on this appeal.1 We 
set forth the background of the case at some length. 
 
A. The Parties 
 
Plaintiff Tai Kwan Cureton is an African-American who 
graduated from Simon Gratz High School in Philadelphia in 
June 1996 ranking 27th in a class of 305 students. 
Cureton was a member of the track team and earned both 
academic and athletic honors as a high school student. 
Cureton exceeded the NCAA GPA requirements but did not 
achieve the NCAA required SAT score. Cureton alleged that 
several NCAA Division I schools recruited him before he 
obtained his non-qualifying score on the SAT, but that after 
he took the SAT a lesser number of Division I schools 
recruited him and such institutions denied him admission 
and/or athletic financial aid. Cureton, who alleged he lost 
an opportunity to compete as a freshman in Division I 
varsity intercollegiate athletics because of NCAA 
regulations, enrolled in a Division III school. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The SAT is a nationally recognized standardized test. As an alternative 
to the SAT, a student athlete may take the ACT, another nationally 
recognized standardized test. The parties, however, have emphasized the 
SAT in this action so we discuss only that test. 
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Plaintiff Leatrice Shaw is an African-American who also 
graduated from Simon Gratz High School and was ranked 
5th in a class of 305 students. Shaw was a member of the 
track team and earned both academic and athletic honors 
and was selected for membership in the National Honor 
Society. Shaw exceeded the NCAA minimum GPA 
requirement for freshman-year athletic participation, but 
failed to achieve the minimum required score on the SAT. 
The Division I school that Shaw entered did offer her 
athletic financial aid, but she was unable to compete on the 
track team during her freshman year because of the NCAA 
regulations at issue here. 
 
Plaintiffs Andrea Gardner and Alexander Wesby are 
African-American student athletes who exceeded the NCAA 
minimum GPA requirement for freshman year athletic 
participation, but failed to achieve the minimum required 
score on the standardized college admissions tests. Though 
they originally were not parties, the district court allowed 
them to intervene by order dated December 18, 1998, 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. 
 
The defendant NCAA is an unincorporated voluntary 
association of more than one thousand members, a 
majority of which are public and private four-year colleges 
and universities that conduct varsity intercollegiate athletic 
programs in the United States. The NCAA member colleges 
and universities are divided into Divisions. Division I 
consists of more than three hundred members. The 
Divisions adopt their own bylaws, although some NCAA 
bylaws are applicable to all three Divisions. This action 
concerns a bylaw adopted by Division I and the curtailment 
of the plaintiffs' opportunity to participate in Division I 
athletics. 
 
The National Youth Sports Program (the "NYSP"), which 
is not a defendant but nevertheless is implicated in this 
case, is a youth enrichment program that provides summer 
education and sports instruction on NCAA member and 
non-member institution campuses. The Department of 
Health and Human Services provides the NYSP with Federal 
financial assistance. Before 1992, these funds were 
advanced to the NCAA, but were not diverted for its use. In 
1989, the NYSP Fund (the "Fund") was established as a 
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nonprofit corporation to administer the NYSP. Since 1992, 
the department has granted the financial aid intended for 
the NYSP directly to the Fund. The Fund is regarded as an 
NCAA "affiliate." 
 
Before 1971, college freshmen were not allowed to 
compete in varsity sports. Since then, the NCAA has 
adopted many rules defining freshman eligibility for varsity 
intercollegiate athletic competition, but member institutions 
continue to make individual admissions decisions. One of 
these rules, Proposition 48, implemented in 1986, required 
high school graduates to have a minimum 2.0 GPA in 11 
academic core courses and a minimum score of 700 on the 
SAT to be eligible for competition, practice, andfinancial 
aid based upon athletic ability. Division I implemented the 
requirement in response to the public's perception that 
NCAA schools were exploiting student athletes for their 
talents without concern for whether they graduated. 
Division I felt compelled to act despite the fact that student 
athletes were graduating at rates comparable to non- 
athletes, and African-American student athletes were 
graduating at higher rates than African-American students 
who were not athletes. Since 1989, when the NCAA phased 
in the eligibility requirements, the graduation rates of 
student athletes, especially African-Americans, have 
increased. 
 
Division I modified these rules in 1992 when it adopted 
Proposition 16, which is at issue here. Proposition 16 
increased the number of core courses to 13 and utilized an 
index to determine eligibility based on a formula combining 
the student's GPA and SAT scores. Using this index, the 
minimum score for a student with a GPA of 2.0 is 1010 on 
the SAT. Similarly, a student who scored an 820 on the 
SAT would need at least a 2.5 GPA to meet the eligibility 
requirements.2 As the district court pointed out, this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A student athlete not qualifying under Proposition 16 may become a 
"partial qualifier" if he or she achieves a minimum SAT score between 
720 and 810 along with a core GPA that produces a combined score 
comparable to the combined score required for qualifiers. See Cureton, 
37 F. Supp.2d at 691. A partial qualifier cannot compete in 
intercollegiate athletics during his or her freshman year, but is eligible 
to receive athletically related financial aid. See id. Shaw, Gardner, and 
Wesby are partial qualifiers. 
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modification resulted "in a heavier weighting of the 
standardized test" because the minimum GPA requirement 
was two standard deviations from the mean, whereas the 
minimum test score requirement was only one standard 
deviation from the mean. Cureton, 37 F. Supp.2d at 691. 
 
B. The Action 
 
Cureton and Shaw filed the complaint in this case on 
January 8, 1997. They alleged the minimum standardized 
test score component of Proposition 16 had an unjustified 
disparate impact on African-American student-athletes in 
violation of regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000d et seq., 
which precludes exclusion from participation in, denial of 
the benefits of, and discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance on account of 
race, color, or national origin. The NCAA moved to dismiss 
the complaint, or alternatively for summary judgment, on 
the following grounds: (1) there is no private right of action 
for unintentional discrimination under Title VI or its 
accompanying regulations; (2) the NCAA is not a"program 
or activity" subject to Title VI; and (3) the NCAA does not 
receive Federal funds necessary to subject it to Title VI. The 
plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the 
grounds that, as a matter of law, the NCAA was a covered 
program or activity subject to a Title VI action for 
unintentional discrimination and was a recipient of Federal 
financial assistance for purposes of Title VI. 
 
On October 9, 1997, the district court issued an opinion 
and order denying the NCAA's motion but granting in part 
and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion for partial 
summary judgment. See Cureton v. NCAA, No. 97-131, 
1997 WL 634376 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 1997). In that opinion, 
the court determined that there was a private cause of 
action under Title VI and its accompanying regulations to 
remedy cases of disparate impact and that the NCAA was a 
program or activity covered by Title VI. Id. at *2. The court, 
however, held that it could not conclude on the record 
before it that the NCAA was a recipient of Federal funds as 
a result of its relationship with the NYSP. In view of our 
recent opinion in Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 
1999), recognizing the existence of a private right of action 
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under Title VI, there no longer is an issue on this appeal 
regarding that point. 
 
Thereafter, following discovery, the plaintiffs and the 
NCAA again filed cross-motions for summary judgment. By 
an opinion and order dated March 8, 1999, the district 
court denied the NCAA's motion but granted the plaintiffs' 
motion. See Cureton, 37 F. Supp.2d at 715. The district 
court held that Proposition 16's disparate impact on 
African-Americans violates Title VI and the regulations 
issued under it. 
 
The court adopted two distinct theories to support its 
finding that the NCAA is subject to the prohibitions of Title 
VI. See id. at 696. First, the court found that the NCAA is 
an "indirect recipient of federal financial assistance" 
because it exercises effective control over a block grant 
given by the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services to the NYSP.3 See Id. at 694. Second, the 
court held that Title VI covers the NCAA because member 
schools, which indisputably receive federal funds, have 
vested the NCAA with controlling authority over federally 
funded athletic programs. See Id. 
 
The court then turned to the plaintiffs' argument that the 
SAT component of Proposition 16 violates Title VI because 
of its alleged discriminatory disparate impact on African- 
American student athletes.4 See id. at 696-712. It found 
that the plaintiffs provided statistical evidence sufficient to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The complaint also alleges that the Fund receives money from the 
Department of Education. Nevertheless, as far as we can ascertain, the 
record does not contain any evidence to support this conclusion, and it 
appears that the plaintiffs have prosecuted this case only by arguing 
that the NCAA receives funds from the Department of Health and 
Human Services. However, inasmuch as the regulations of each 
department are parallel, we have cited to both sets of them. 
 
4. A disparate impact case is based upon the idea that "some . . . 
practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in 
operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination." 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987, 108 S.Ct. 
2777, 2785 (1988). Many cases have applied this theory to educational 
institutions and practices. See, e.g., New York Urban League, Inc. v. 
State 
of New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995) (collecting cases). 
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show that the use of the SAT minimum standard "plainly 
evince[d] that African-Americans are being selected by 
Proposition 16 at a rate disproportionately lower than 
whites sufficient to infer causation." Consequently, the 
plaintiffs raised a prima facie case of disparate impact 
discrimination. See id. at 699-701. 
 
The district court rejected the NCAA's argument that 
Proposition 16 benefits African-Americans because of the 
alleged increase in graduation rates it has brought about. 
The court stated that "the alleged beneficial impact 
(increased graduation rates) redounds at the `back-end' 
while the adverse impact occurs up-front." Id. at 700. In 
this regard, it cited Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 452- 
56, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2533-35 (1982), for the principle that 
racial balance at the end of an employer's entire 
promotional process does not preclude a plaintiff from 
making a prima facie case of disparate impact 
discrimination based on the impact of one component of 
the process. Where the initial examination used by an 
employer in the challenged hiring process had a disparate 
impact, a "bottom-line" justification is not a defense to 
employer liability. See id. Accordingly, the district court 
concluded that the NCAA did not have a defense simply 
because African-Americans enrolled in its member schools 
after the adoption of Proposition 16 had an enhanced 
chance of getting a degree. 
 
Inasmuch as the plaintiffs demonstrated that African- 
Americans are less likely to meet the standards required by 
Proposition 16 than whites, the burden shifted to the NCAA 
to show an educational necessity for the bylaw. The district 
court approved the legitimacy of the NCAA's first proffered 
goal of raising all student athletes' graduation rates, 
Cureton, 37 F. Supp.2d at 703, yet found the NCAA's 
second proffered goal -- closing the gap between white and 
black student athletes' graduation rates -- not to have been 
an actual goal of Proposition 16. Furthermore, the court 
found that there was no legal "support for an educational 
institution . . . to engage in such a goal." See id. at 704. 
Next, the court determined that Proposition 16's use of the 
SAT as a cutoff was not justified by the legitimate goal of 
increasing student athletes' graduation rates. Id. at 706-12. 
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Moreover, the court found that the plaintiffs "have shown at 
least three alternative practices resulting in less racial 
disproportionality while still serving the NCAA's goal of 
raising student athlete graduation rates -- not raising them 
above a certain threshold number. That is all the proof that 
plaintiffs need to demonstrate under Title VI." Id. at 714. 
 
In view of its conclusions, the district court granted 
summary judgment to the plaintiffs, and permanently 
enjoined the NCAA from continued operation and 
implementation of Proposition 16. See id. at 714-15. 
Although regarding the matter as ripe for appeal, the court 
retained jurisdiction. See id. at 715. By order dated March 
16, 1999, the district court modified the March 8, 1999 
opinion and order so that the NCAA was permanently 
enjoined from denying student athletes freshmen-year 
eligibility on the basis of the minimum standardized test 
score cutoffs in Proposition 16, but nevertheless could use 
minimum GPA cutoffs. See id. at 716. 
 
Subsequently, the NCAA appealed and unsuccessfully 
sought a stay in the district court. The NCAA then sought 
a stay from this court, which we granted on March 30, 1999.5 
 
II. JURISDICTION and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S 1292(a)(1) 
as, notwithstanding the district court's entry of a 
permanent injunction, it has not entered a final judgment. 
We exercise plenary review on this appeal from the district 
court's orders on the motions for summary judgment. See 
Seibert v. Nusbaum, Stein, Goldstein, Bronstein & Compeau, 
167 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 1999). Of course, on this appeal 
we can remand the matter for entry of a summary 
judgment in favor of the NCAA if we conclude that on the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal on April 8, 1999, which we dismissed by 
order dated June 11, 1999, as plaintiffs could raise the issues 
mentioned in the cross-appeal as alternative grounds to affirm. See Rite- 
Aid of Pa., Inc. v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 853 (3d Cir. 1999). On July 
1, 1999, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class 
certification. See Cureton, 1999 WL 447313 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 1999). In 
view of our result, we will not make further reference to the 
certification. 
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undisputed facts it is entitled to a summary judgment as a 
matter of law. See Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1328 (3d 
Cir. 1991). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to section 601 of 
Title VI, which provides: 
 
       No person in the United States shall, on the grounds of 
       race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
       participation in, or be denied the benefits of, or be 
       subjected to discrimination under any program or 
       activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 2000d. The Supreme Court has determined that 
section 601 prohibits discrimination in or exclusion from 
Federally financially assisted programs or activities only on 
the basis of intentional discrimination. See Alexander v. 
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-93, 105 S.Ct. 712, 716 (1985); 
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 103 
S.Ct. 3221 (1983); Powell, 189 F.3d at 392. But the 
plaintiffs do not allege intentional discrimination. 
Accordingly, they rely on regulations implementing section 
601, which the Departments of Health and Human Services 
and Education adopted pursuant to section 602 of Title VI 
which provides, in relevant part: 
 
       Each Federal department and agency which is 
       empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to 
       any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or 
       contract . . ., is authorized and directed to effectuate 
       the provisions of [Section 601] of this title with respect 
       to such program or activity by issuing rules, 
       regulations or orders of general applicability. . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. S 2000d-1. These regulations extend section 601 
to racial, color and national origin discrimination 
predicated on recipients administering programs and 
activities with a disparate impact. 
 
But section 601 and the regulations have their 
limitations, for they are enforceable only against the 
recipients of Federal financial assistance. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000d. The NCAA asserts that it is not a direct recipient 
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of Federal financial assistance and that its relationship with 
third parties does not support the extension of Title VI 
coverage to the NCAA as an indirect recipient of such 
assistance. 
 
The district court recited four different theories that the 
plaintiffs proffered to support the extension of Title VI 
coverage to the NCAA: 
 
       (1) that the NCAA directly receives federalfinancial 
       assistance through the Fund (which indisputably is a 
       recipient of federal funds) because the Fund is nothing 
       more than the NCAA's alter ego; (2) that the NCAA 
       indirectly receives federal financial assistance through 
       the Fund due to the NCAA's complete control over the 
       Fund; (3) that member schools who receive federal 
       funds have created and comprise the NCAA and that 
       the NCAA governs its members with respect to athletics 
       rules; and (4) that recipients of federal financial 
       assistance have ceded controlling authority over a 
       federally funded program to the NCAA, who then 
       becomes subject to Title VI regardless of whether it is 
       itself a recipient. 
 
Cureton, 37 F. Supp.2d at 694 (emphasis added). 
 
The district court rejected the first theory, as it concluded 
that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the 
NYSP was the alter ego of the NCAA. 
 
The court did conclude, however, that the NCAA was an 
indirect recipient of Federal financial assistance because 
"although the Fund is the named recipient of the block 
grant, it is merely a conduit through which the NCAA 
makes all of the decisions about the Fund and the use of 
the federal funds." Id. The NCAA, on the other hand, 
asserts that there is no evidence to support a finding that 
the NCAA itself controls the Federal monies disbursed by 
the Fund. 
 
The court alternatively determined that the NCAA was 
subject to Title VI coverage because of its relationship to its 
member institutions. The court stated: 
 
       Whether characterized as a `delegation' or an 
       `assignment' of `controlling authority,' `regulation,' or 
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       `supervision,' Plaintiffs have established on this record 
       that the member colleges and universities have granted 
       to the NCAA the authority to promulgate rules affecting 
       intercollegiate athletics that the members are obliged to 
       abide and enforce. Under these facts, the NCAA comes 
       sufficiently within the scope of Title VI irrespective of 
       its receipt of federal funds. 
 
Cureton, 37 F. Supp.2d at 696. 
 
The district court was aware of National Collegiate 
Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 119 S.Ct. 924 (1999), which 
determined that the mere fact that the NCAA received funds 
from members that received Federal financial assistance did 
not subject the NCAA to coverage under Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972. See Cureton, 37 F. 
Supp.2d at 693. While the district court regarded that case 
as "applicable" under Title VI, it noted that the Supreme 
Court left open the possibility that the NCAA could be 
subject to Title IX coverage on the basis of some other 
theory. See id. (citing NCAA v. Smith , 119 S.Ct. at 929). 
Thus, the district court concluded that the NCAA was 
subject to Title VI. 
 
We do not find it necessary to determine whether, by 
reason of the NCAA's relationship with the NYSP or the 
Fund, we should regard the NCAA as receiving Federal 
financial assistance. Rather, we will assume without 
deciding that these relationships are sufficient to establish 
that Federal financial assistance to the Fund is assistance 
to the NCAA itself. But section 601, as originally written, 
did not preclude recipients of Federal financial assistance 
from discriminating with respect to a program not receiving 
such assistance. Thus, the language of Title VI is program 
specific as it relates to "participation in," "[denial of] the 
benefits of " or "discrimination under" "any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." See Grove 
City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 570-71, 104 S.Ct. 1211, 
1220 (1984) (Title IX); Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 
414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969) (Title VI). 
 
It thus follows that when Congress enacted Title VI, a 
department's authority to promulgate regulations under 
section 602 to effectuate the provisions of section 601 was 
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subject to the program specific limitations of section 601. 
See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 538, 
102 S.Ct. 1912, 1926 (1982); see also Grove City, 465 U.S. 
at 570-71, 102 S.Ct. at 1220. Consequently, when the 
departments adopted the regulations under Title VI, see 45 
C.F.R. S 80.3 and 34 C.F.R. S 100.3, the regulations, 
though expanding on section 601 by precluding the use of 
"criteria or methods of administration which have the effect 
of subjecting individuals to discrimination," only related to 
programs or activities receiving Federal financial assistance. 
See 45 C.F.R. S 80.3(b)(2); 34 C.F.R.S 100.3(b)(2). Thus, the 
regulations, like the statute, are program specific. 
 
Moreover, the regulations themselves demonstrate that 
they are program specific. Under the regulations, an 
application for Federal financial assistance to carry out a 
program must include assurances of nondiscrimination 
which may go beyond the program to be Federally assisted. 
Thus, 45 C.F.R. S 80.4(d)(2) and 34 C.F.R.S 100.4(d)(2) 
provide that "[t]he assurance required with respect to an 
institution of higher education . . . or any other institution 
. . . shall be applicable to the entire institution unless the 
applicant establishes . . . that the institution's practices in 
designated parts or programs of the institution will in no 
way affect its practices in the program of the institution for 
which Federal financial assistance is sought." Clearly, these 
provisions cannot possibly accommodate a reading of the 
regulations so that as a matter of course their 
discriminatory impact aspects are applied beyond the 
specific program receiving Federal assistance. We are 
constrained to reach this conclusion, as it is obvious that 
a recipient of Federal financial assistance need not give an 
assurance of nondiscrimination with respect to programs in 
no way affecting the Federally assisted program. 
 
It is, of course, true that in response to the Supreme 
Court's program specific interpretation of Title IX in Grove 
City, Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 
1987 and thereby modified Title VI so that it encompasses 
programs or activities of a recipient of Federalfinancial 
assistance on an institution-wide basis. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000d-4a (Title VI); 20 U.S.C. S 1687 (Title IX); see also 
NCAA v. Smith, 119 S.Ct. at 928 & n.4 (After passage of 
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Civil Rights Restoration Act, "if any part of the NCAA 
received federal assistance, all NCAA operations would be 
subject to Title IX."). Nevertheless, the Departments of 
Health and Human Services and Education have not 
modified 34 C.F.R. S 100.13 and 45 C.F.R.S 80.13 following 
enactment of the Restoration Act. Consequently, the 
regulations, which, unlike Title VI include disparate impact 
provisions, by their terms remain program specific. It 
therefore inexorably follows that, to the extent this action is 
predicated on the NCAA's receiving Federal financial 
assistance by reason of grants to the Fund, it must fail as 
the Fund's programs and activities are not in issue in this 
case. 
 
In reaching our result, we also point out the following. 
Neither Congress nor the Departments of Health and 
Human Services or Education has considered, at least in a 
formal proceeding of which we are aware, what the 
consequences would be if the disparate impact regulations 
were expanded beyond their current program specific 
limitations. It might well be that such expanded regulations 
could subject all aspects of an institution of higher 
education's activities to scrutiny for disparate 
discriminatory impact beyond anything Congress could 
have intended. Furthermore, the regulations have not been 
amended pursuant to the notice and comment provisions of 
the Administrative Procedure Act. Surely, such an 
expansion should not be made without the opportunity for 
comment by interested parties. See 5 U.S.C.S 553; see also 
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764, 89 S.Ct. 
1426, 1429 (1969). 
 
We realize, of course, that arguably the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act implicitly expanded the scope of"program" 
within 45 C.F.R. S 80.13 and 34 C.F.R. S 100.13 so that it 
is not limited to a specific activity; after all, without such 
expansion there would be no regulations dealing with 
disparate treatment by reason of race, color, or national 
origin beyond the program actually receiving Federal 
financial assistance. We, however, will not address that 
possibility here beyond pointing it out, as this case does 
not involve any allegation of disparate treatment. 
Consequently, we have no reason to consider whether the 
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regulations under section 602 could be applied in disparate 
treatment cases on an institution-wide basis. 
 
We note that the dissent points out that the Fund may be 
the alter ego of the NCAA. See Maj. Op. at 13. It seems 
quite clear in view of our conclusions with respect to the 
limited scope of the regulations, with which the dissent 
agrees, that it is immaterial whether the Fund is the 
NCAA's alter ego inasmuch as the discriminatory impact 
aspects of the regulations only can be applied to the 
specific program receiving Federal assistance and the 
Fund's programs are not in issue here. See Grove City, 465 
U.S. at 571-72, 104 S.Ct. at 1220-21 (holding that Title IX 
only applied to college's financial aid program, for which 
federal funds were earmarked, and not to the entire 
institution). Moreover, as we have pointed out the plaintiffs 
have not alleged that this is a discriminatory treatment 
case. Accordingly, even if the NCAA directly received the 
Federal financial assistance paid to the Fund our result 
would be the same. 
 
The foregoing conclusions bring us to the question of 
whether the NCAA is a recipient of Federal funds by reason 
of what the plaintiffs call its "controlling authority" over 
programs or activities receiving Federal financial assistance. 
The case law suggests that the critical inquiry in 
determining whether an entity is an indirect recipient of 
Federal assistance is whether that entity is the intended 
recipient of Federal funds, intention being from Congress's 
point of view. See id. at 563-65 & n.13, 104 S.Ct. at 1216- 
17 & n.13. The Supreme Court, however, already has found 
no indication that member schools paid their dues to the 
NCAA with Federal assistance funds "earmarked" for that 
purpose. NCAA v. Smith, 119 S.Ct. at 929. Thus, the 
controlling authority argument can be sustained, if at all, 
only on some basis beyond the NCAA's mere receipt of 
dues. See id. at 929-30. Of course, in considering this 
"controlling authority" argument, we emphasize that under 
the applicable regulations only "recipients" of Federal 
financial assistance are subject to the disparate impact 
regulations, not merely organizations which have some 
relationship with entities receiving such assistance or 
organizations which benefit from such assistance. See 
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United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 
477 U.S. 597, 605-07, 106 S.Ct. 2705, 2710-12 (1986). 
 
In Horner v. Kentucky High School Athletic Ass'n , 43 F.3d 
265, 272 (6th Cir. 1994), the court held that the Kentucky 
State Board for Elementary and Secondary Education and 
the Kentucky High School Athletic Association, its agent to 
manage interscholastic sports, were subject to Title IX. But 
in that case, the Board controlled and managed on behalf 
of the Kentucky Department of Education over $396 million 
in Federal funds. Furthermore, the Association was its 
agent authorized by statute to manage interscholastic 
athletics.6 On the other hand, more recently the court in 
Smith v. Metropolitan School District, 128 F.3d 1014, 1019- 
21 (7th Cir. 1997), held that individuals in a supervisory 
capacity are not liable in an action under Title IX because 
they are not recipients of Federal funds notwithstanding 
the circumstance that they may have some control over the 
funds.7 Of course, Title IX cases are instructive in this Title 
VI action as the statutes are essentially similar. See NCAA 
v. Smith, 119 S.Ct. at 928 n.3; see also Paralyzed Veterans, 
477 U.S. at 600 n.4, 106 S.Ct. at 2708 n.4. 
 
While not a Title VI or Title IX case, we find the Supreme 
Court's decision in NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 109 
S.Ct. 454 (1988), instructive, as that case makes clear that 
the NCAA does not "control" its members. Tarkanian was a 
tenured coach, whom the University of Nevada at Las Vegas 
(UNLV) reluctantly had suspended under threat of NCAA 
sanctions. He then brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983 claiming that the NCAA was a state actor, because 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Actually, Horner was an appeal from an order for summary judgment, 
so the court based its holding on the plaintiffs' opposition to the 
defendants' motion. It remained for the plaintiffs to prove their case on 
the remand. 
 
7. In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 119 S.Ct. 1661 (1999), 
a Title IX sexual harassment case against a school board and individual 
officials, the district court dismissed the action against all the 
defendants. While the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court did 
not comment on the case against the individuals, as the plaintiffs 
appealed the dismissal of the Title IX claims only against the school 
board to the court of appeals. Id. at 1668; see Davis v. Monroe County 
Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1188 n.1 (11th Cir. 1996). 
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the "UNLV delegated its own functions to the NCAA, 
clothing the [NCAA] with authority both to adopt rules 
governing UNLV's athletic programs and to enforce those 
rules on behalf of UNLV." Id. at 192, 109 S.Ct. at 462. The 
Court held that the NCAA was not a state actor. While the 
Court recognized that the NCAA's rules and 
recommendations clearly influenced the UNLV, it concluded 
that the UNLV, not the NCAA, took the final action 
suspending Tarkanian. See id. at 192, 109 S.Ct. at 462. 
 
The Court reasoned that the UNLV "delegated no power 
to the NCAA to take specific action against any university 
employee. The commitment by UNLV to adhere to NCAA 
enforcement procedures was enforceable only by sanctions 
that the NCAA might impose on UNLV itself." Id. at 195-96, 
109 S.Ct. at 464. The Court explained that the UNLV had 
the option to retain Tarkanian and risk sanctions, perhaps 
even expulsion, or to withdraw voluntarily from the NCAA. 
See id. at 197-98, 109 S.Ct. at 465. The Court questioned 
Tarkanian's assertion that "the power of the NCAA is so 
great that the UNLV had no practical alternative to 
compliance with its demands." Id. at 198-99, 109 S.Ct. at 
465. It stated that "[t]he university's desire to remain a 
powerhouse among the Nation's college basketball teams is 
understandable, and nonmembership in the NCAA 
obviously would thwart that goal. But that UNLV's options 
were unpalatable does not mean that they were 
nonexistent." Id. at 198 n.19, 109 S.Ct. at 465 n.19. 
 
Similarly, the ultimate decision as to which freshmen an 
institution will permit to participate in varsity 
intercollegiate athletics and which applicants will be 
awarded athletic scholarships belongs to the member 
schools. The fact that the institutions make these decisions 
cognizant of NCAA sanctions does not mean that the NCAA 
controls them, because they have the option, albeit 
unpalatable, of risking sanctions or voluntarily withdrawing 
from the NCAA. In this regard, we point out that this case 
differs from Horner as there the Athletic Association was 
exercising public authority with respect to its functions. We 
emphasize that the NCAA members have not ceded 
controlling authority to the NCAA by giving it the power to 
enforce its eligibility rules directly against students. 
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We also point out that applying the disparate impact 
regulations to the NCAA is inconsistent with the 
contractual character of section 601. The Supreme Court 
explained in Paralyzed Veterans that the antidiscrimination 
provisions in section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
29 U.S.C. S 794, which has language tracking Title VI, have 
a contractual basis. Accordingly, the Court said that 
"Congress limited the scope of S 504 to those who actually 
`receive' federal financial assistance because it sought to 
impose S 504 coverage as a form of contractual cost of the 
recipient's agreement to accept federal funds." 477 U.S. at 
605, 106 S.Ct. at 2711. Thus, "[b]y limiting coverage to 
recipients, Congress imposes the obligations ofS 504 upon 
those who are in a position to accept or reject those 
obligations as a part of the decision whether or not to 
`receive' federal funds." Id. at 606, 106 S.Ct. at 2711. 
 
Title VI is a similar statute. See 45 C.F.R.S 80.4; 34 
C.F.R. S 100.4. But there is no contractual privity between 
the Departments of Health and Human Services and 
Education and the NCAA with respect to Federal financial 
assistance to the NCAA members. Therefore, the NCAA is 
not in a position to accept or reject the Federal funds paid 
to those institutions. We do not suggest that an absence of 
privity means that in no circumstances may a controlling 
authority argument be viable; we note that those who truly 
assume control of federally-funded programs are in a 
position to accept or reject that control as part of a decision 
whether or not to receive federal funds indirectly. 
Nonetheless the absence of privity clearly signals that a 
court should be circumspect in imposing Title VI 
obligations on an entity which is not a direct recipient of 
Federal financial assistance. Such caution is consistent 
with the Spending Clause foundation for Title VI. See Davis 
v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S.Ct. 1661, 1669-70 
(1999). 
 
We recognize that the dissent suggests that the NCAA 
constitution requires NCAA members to cede authority over 
their athletic programs to the NCAA, but the NCAA 
constitution expressly provides for the retention of 
institutional control over individual athletic programs. 
While the constitution requires conformity with the NCAA's 
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rules and regulations, the ultimate decisions whether to 
conform are made by individual members. Therefore, the 
constitution is completely consistent with our result. 
Furthermore, we cannot understand how the fact that the 
NCAA promulgates rules and regulations with respect to 
intercollegiate athletics somehow means that the NCAA has 
controlling authority over its members' programs or 
activities receiving Federal financial assistance. After all, 
the institutions decide what applicants to admit, what 
employees to hire, and what facilities to acquire. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In view of the foregoing determinations, it is unnecessary 
for us to reach the other issues raised on this appeal. 
Moreover, inasmuch as the parties agree that there are no 
disputes of material fact with respect to the question of 
whether the NCAA is subject to Title VI (and we are aware 
of none), and we have concluded that the NCAA is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law, there is no reason why 
this litigation should continue. Consequently, we will 
reverse the order of the district court of March 8, 1999, and 
will remand the case to the district court to enter summary 
judgment for the NCAA. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
 
I agree with the majority's analysis insofar as my 
colleagues conclude that the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment can not be sustained under the 
applicable regulations of the Departments of Health and 
Human Services and the Department of Education. As I 
discuss below, the language of the regulations those 
agencies adopted pursuant to SS 601 and 602 of Title VI are 
program-specific. Accordingly, it appears that the relief for 
the discriminatory impact that the District Court found 
under Proposition 16 must be limited to the National Youth 
Sports Program (the "Fund"). However, I believe that the 
NCAA may well be subject to Title VI under the plaintiff 's 
theory that the NCAA is a controlling entity of its member 
institutions, or the alternative alter ego theory advanced by 
the plaintiffs. Thus, I can not agree with the majority's 
analysis insofar as it holds that the NCAA is entitled to 
summary judgment. Rather, I believe that we should 
remand for a trial to resolve the issue of whether the NCAA 
is a controlling entity under Title VI or the Fund is merely 
its alter ego. However, before explaining my position, a brief 
parenthetical is necessary. 
 
Title VI extends protection based upon race, color or 
national origin. Accordingly, this dispute is framed by 
issues of race. Nevertheless, the issues here are of such 
gravity, and the social context in which they arise are of 
such magnitude, that I think it is important that an aspect 
of this controversy not be lost even though it is irrelevant 
to our legal analysis. Buried deep within this record is a 
statement that is of such consequence that it ought not to 
be ignored. Yet, that statement has been lost in the 
intensity of the debates underlying this legal dispute. The 
NCAA's Rule Change Memorandum contains the following 
statement: 
 
       Low-income student-athletes also have been impacted 
       to a greater degree than other student-athletes by 
       Proposition 16 standards. For example, in 1997, 18 
       percent of all student-athletes with a self-reported 
       family income below $30,000 failed to qualify, whereas 
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       only 2.5 percent of student-athletes with a family 
       income greater than $80,000 failed to qualify. 
 
JA at 756a. Proposition 16 therefore has a disparate impact 
on poor student-athletes regardless of race. Thus, the 
dynamics of the disparate impact here are the dynamics of 
socio-economic status. These are issues of class; not race. 
Student athletes are more likely to be adversely affected by 
Proposition 16 whether they are Black or White if they are 
poor. Concomitantly, student athletes are more likely to be 
advantaged by Proposition 16 if they have attended schools 
with abundant resources and are from families that know 
about, and have the resources to avail themselves of, the 
proliferation of privately sponsored courses that prepare 
high school students for the SAT exam. See Los Angeles 
Times, More Latinos Take SAT Exams But Scores Lagging, 
Sept 2, 1998, at A1 ("Suburban and affluent students . . . 
enjoy another advantage--greater access to commercial test 
preparation courses that can add 120 points or more to a 
student's SAT score."). The economic stratification that 
exists in our society often means that issues of class are 
either translated into issues of race, or the two are so 
intertwined as to be inseparable. 
 
Because we function as a court of law, and not as a 
legislature, the significance of the NCAA's Memorandum 
can play no role in our adjudication of this appeal. 
However, the explosiveness of the issues lying coiled just 
below the surface of this dispute require that the broader 
implications of this debate be kept in proper perspective.1 
 
I. The Applicable Regulations. 
 
I begin my legal analysis with the regulations that have 
been promulgated under Title VI. 34 C.F.R. S 100.3 
promulgated by the Office of Civil Rights of the Department 
of Education provides in relevant part that: 
 
       (b)(2) A recipient [of funds under Title VI], in 
       determining the types of services, financial aid, or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This observation is not intended to detract from, or add to, the 
discussion of the cultural bias that many believe also influences SAT 
scores. 
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       other benefits, . . . or the class of individuals to whom, 
       or the situations in which, such services, . . . will be 
       provided under any such program, or the class of 
       individuals to be afforded an opportunity to participate 
       in any such program, may not, directly or through 
       contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or 
       methods of administration which have the effect of 
       subjecting individuals to discrimination because of 
       their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of 
       defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of 
       the objectives of the program as respect individuals of 
       a particular race, color, or national origin. 
 
34 C.F.R. S 1003(b)(2). The cited Authority for that 
regulation is "Sec. 601, 602, 604, Civil Rights Act of 1964; 
78 Stat. 252, 253, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, 2000d-1m 2000d-3." 
The Department of Health and Human Services 
promulgated an identical regulation at 45 C.F.R. 
S 80.3(b)(2), and the identical provisions of The Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 are cited as authority for that regulation. As the 
majority notes, the scope of these regulations is limited by 
34 C.F.R. S 100.4(d)(2) and 45 C.F.R. S 80.4(d)(2) 
respectively. That limitation provides that the respective 
prohibition of discrimination "shall be applicable to the 
entire institution unless the applicant establishes . . . that 
the institution's practices in designated parts or programs 
of the institution will in no way affect its practices in the 
program of the institution for which Federal financial 
assistance is sought." See Maj. Op. at 15.2 
 
As the majority explains, this limitation is a direct result 
of the original interpretation of Title VI. See Grove City v. 
Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). Maj. Op. at 15-16. However, 
Congress subsequently enacted the Civil Rights Restoration 
Act, 42 U.S.C. S 2000-4, and thereby broadened the reach 
of Title VI beyond the offending program in response to 
Grove City. However, neither HHS nor the Department of 
Education amended the applicable regulations to make 
them coextensive with the expanded scope of the Civil 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Here, there is nothing to demonstrate that practices of the Fund (the 
direct recipient of Title VI funds) affect the broader practices of the 
NCAA. 
 
                                24 
  
Rights Restoration Act. Consequently, regulations that were 
initially designed to lengthen the reach of a statutory 
prohibition against discrimination by extending it to 
unintended discriminatory consequences ("disparate 
impact") now appear to have a shorter reach than the 
statutory prohibition the regulations were supposed to 
expand. 
 
My colleagues address the apparent tension between the 
Civil Rights Restoration Act and the regulations as follows: 
 
        We realize, of course, that arguably the Civil Rights 
       Restoration Act implicitly expanded the scope of the 
       "program" within 45 C.F.R. 21 80.13 and 34 C.F.R. 
       S 100.13 so that it is not limited to a specific activity; 
       after all, without such expansion there would be no 
       regulations dealing with disparate treatment by reason 
       of race, color, or national origin beyond the program 
       actually receiving Federal financial assistance. We, 
       however, will not address that possibility here beyond 
       pointing it out, as this case does not involve any 
       allegation of disparate treatment. Consequently, we 
       have no reason to consider whether the regulations 
       under section 602 could be applied in disparate 
       treatment cases on an institution-wide basis. 
 
Maj. Op. at 16-17 (emphasis in original). 
 
It may be that this regulatory anomaly is more the result 
of administrative inertia than studied decision making. 
However, the agencies ought not to assume that their 
regulations have been implicitly amended by the 
subsequent legislation. If our analysis of the explicit 
language of these regulations is not what the agencies 
intend, I would hope that they take steps to promulgate 
amendments to their regulations that will clearly reflect the 
intended scope of the meaning of "program" as that term 
relates to Title VI, and similar prohibitions of 
discrimination. 
 
Of course, this does not end the inquiry. As the majority 
notes, we must still determine "whether the NCAA is a 
recipient of Federal funds by reason of what the plaintiffs 
call its `controlling authority' over programs or activities 
receiving Federal financial assistance." Maj. Op. at 17. It is 
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at this point that I part company with my colleagues as I 
believe that the NCAA may well be subject to Title VI 
because it may be a controlling authority, or because the 
Fund may be its alter ego. Although the Supreme Court 
held in NCAA v. Smith, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 924, 926 
(1999), that dues payments to the NCAA from its member 
institutions, who are themselves recipients of Federal 
financial assistance, are not sufficient to subject the NCAA 
to Title IX, the Court refused to reject either of these two 
alternative theories as a bases of recovery under Title IX. 
Rather, the Court stated that it would not decide the 
question of whether the NCAA "directly and indirectly 
receives federal financial assistance" because of its 
relationship to the Fund, and the question of whether 
"when a recipient cedes controlling authority over a 
federally funded program to another entity, the controlling 
entity is covered by Title IX regardless [of] whether it is 
itself a recipient" because neither question was decided by 
the lower courts. Id. at 930. Thus, the Court left "resolution 
of those grounds to the courts below on remand." Id. at 
926. Those questions, albeit with regard to Title VI and not 
Title IX, are squarely before us now, and I do not believe 
that either proposition can be rejected as a matter of law. 
 
II. The NCAA as a Controlling Authority. 
 
As noted above, the NCAA is not subject to Title VI 
merely because it receives dues from member institutions 
who are themselves recipients of Federal assistance. Smith, 
___ U. S. at ___, 119 S.Ct. at 926. The Federal funds going 
to the NCAA member institutions are not earmarked for 
NCAA dues, and therefore, although the NCAA is a 
beneficiary of those funds it is not a "recipient." See United 
States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 
477 U.S. 597, 605-07 (1986). 
 
Thus, plaintiffs' "controlling authority argument can be 
sustained, if at all, only on some basis beyond the NCAA's 
mere receipt of dues." Maj. Op. at 17. For purposes of our 
discussion, there are two entities over which the NCAA may 
have controlling authority -- the NCAA's member 
institutions, and the Fund. I will first explain why I believe 
the plaintiffs have demonstrated that the NCAA may have 
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controlling authority over its members, and then discuss 
the NCAA's relationship to the Fund. 
 
A. The NCAA's Control of Member Institutions. 
 
1. The NCAA Constitution 
 
The constitution of the NCAA provides in part: "The 
control and responsibility for the conduct of intercollegiate 
athletics shall be exercised by the [member] institution 
itself." NCAA Const., Art, 6, Rule 6.01.1. Atfirst blush, this 
suggests that member institutions have not ceded 
controlling authority over intercollegiate sports to the NCAA 
because constituent colleges and universities retain 
responsibility for, and control of, their intercollegiate 
athletics. 
 
However, the constitution also provides that one of the 
purposes of the NCAA is: "To uphold the principle of 
institutional control of, and responsibility for, all 
intercollegiate sports in conformity with the constitution and 
the bylaws of the Association." NCAA Const., Art. I, Rule 
1.2(b) (emphasis added). The NCAA's constitution also 
states: "It is the responsibility of each member institution to 
control its intercollegiate athletics program in compliance 
with the rules and regulations of the Association. NCAA 
Const., Art. 2, Rule 2.1.1 (emphasis added). These two 
rules appear to be in tension with Rule 6.01.1 and appear 
to trump whatever authority member institutions might 
otherwise have under the NCAA's constitution to retain 
control over their intercollegiate athletic programs. 
Consequently, I believe the plaintiffs here may be correct in 
their contention that the NCAA's constitution requires 
NCAA members to effectively cede authority over their 
intercollegiate athletic programs to the NCAA. Moreover, 
plaintiffs' position is clearly supported by the very 
precedent that my colleagues rely upon in granting 
summary judgment to the NCAA. 
 
2. NCAA v. Tarkanian. 
 
The majority relies heavily upon the Supreme Court's 
decision in NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U. S. 179 (1988), to 
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support its conclusion that the NCAA is not a controlling 
authority of the member institutions. However, Tarkanian 
proves just the opposite. Tarkanian illustrates the extent of 
absolute control the NCAA has over its member colleges 
and universities for purposes of our analysis, and the case 
establishes that the NCAA may well be a controlling 
authority to the extent that it should be subject to Title VI. 
 
Tarkanian involved a dispute between UNLV and its 
basketball coach, Jerry Tarkanian. The Supreme Court 
began its analysis of the issues in that case with "a 
description of the relationship among the three parties -- 
Tarkanian, UNLV, and the NCAA." 488 U.S. at 182. 
Tarkanian had been hired as UNLV's basketball coach in 
1973. He "inherited a team with a mediocre 14-14 record." 
Id. at 180. However, "[f]our years [after Tarkanian became 
coach] the team won 29 out of 32 games and placed third 
in the championship tournament sponsored by the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association." Id. 4 In return, the 
university compensated Tarkanian at a level that reflected 
both his value to the university, and the university's 
appreciation of his having transformed its basketball team 
into a national powerhouse. He "was initially employed on 
a year-to-year basis but became a tenured professor in 
1977." Id. at 182. As a tenured professor Tarkanian would 
have received an annual salary of $53,000. However, as 
head basketball coach his compensation was 
 
       $125,000, plus 10% of the net proceeds received by 
       UNLV for participation in NCAA-authorized 
       championship games, plus fees from basketball camps 
       and clinics, product endorsements, and income 
       realized from writing a newspaper column, speaking on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The importance of the NCAA's Basketball tournament -- popularly 
referred to as "March Madness" -- is evidenced by the fact that a major 
television network recently paid $6 billion for the rights to broadcast 
the 
tournament for the next eleven years. See CBS Signs $6 Billion Deal With 
NCAA, Wall St. J. Nov 19, 1999, at A3 ("To keep the tournament CBS 
had to withstand strong competition from Walt Disney Co., which 
wanted the tournament for its ABC and ESPN Networks and News 
Corp.'s Fox network and its sports cable outlets. . . . with the internet 
and new-media rights as part of the deal, some industry observers 
wondered if CBS didn't get a bargain.") (emphasis added). 
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       a radio program entitled `THE JERRY TARKANIAN SHOW,' and 
       appearing on a television program bearing the same 
       name. That compensation was entirely contingent on 
       [Tarkanian's] continued status as the Head Basketball 
       Coach at UNLV. 
 
Id. at 182, n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted). Despite 
Tarkanian's success, and the university's appreciation of it, 
in September of 1977, the university informed Tarkanian 
that he was going to be suspended. 
 
       No dissatisfaction with Tarkanian, once described as 
       the winningest active basketball coach, motivated his 
       suspension. Rather, the impetus was a report by the 
       NCAA detailing 38 violations of NCAA rules by UNLV 
       personnel, including 10 involving Tarkanian. The NCAA 
       had placed the university's basketball team on 
       probation for two years and ordered UNLV to show 
       cause why the NCAA should not impose further 
       penalties unless UNLV severed all ties during the 
       probation between its intercollegiate athletic program 
       and Tarkanian. 
 
Id. at 180-81 (emphasis added). NCAA rules did not allow 
it to directly sanction Tarkanian for his role in the 
purported rules violations. Accordingly, the NCAA had 
"proposed a series of sanctions against UNLV including a 2- 
year period of probation during which its basketball team 
could not participate in postseason games or appear on 
television." Id. at 186. However, the NCAA also required the 
University "to show cause why additional penalties should 
not be imposed against UNLV if it failed to discipline 
Tarkanian by removing him completely from the 
University's intercollegiate athletic program during the 
probation period." Id. at 187. 
 
In response, the president of the University directed the 
vice president to conduct a hearing to determine what the 
University should do. "Tarkanian and UNLV were 
represented at the hearing; the NCAA was not." Id. at 186. 
Following that hearing, the vice president of the University 
"expressed doubt concerning the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the [NCAA's] findings." Id . Nevertheless, "he 
concluded that `given the terms of our adherence to the 
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NCAA we cannot substitute -- biased as we must be -- our 
own judgment on the credibility of witnesses for that of the 
infractions committee and the Council [of the NCAA]." Id. at 
186-7 (emphasis added). He advised the University's 
president that the NCAA's ultimatum that the University 
sever all ties to its intercollegiate athletic program and 
Tarkanian "or else," left the University with but three 
alternatives. The University could 
 
       1. Reject the sanction requiring [disassociatio n] from 
       Coach Tarkanian from the athletic program and take 
       the risk of still heavier sanctions, e.g., possible extra 
       years of probation. 
 
       2. Recognize the University's delegation to the NC AA of 
       the power to act as ultimate arbiter of these matters, 
       thus reassigning Mr. Tarkanian from his present 
       position--though tenured and without adequate notice-- 
       even while believing that the NCAA was wrong. 
 
       3. Pull out of the NCAA completely on the grounds that 
       [the University] will not execute what [it] hold[s] to be 
       their unjust judgments. 
 
109 S.Ct. at 187 (emphasis added). Faced with an offer it 
could not refuse, the University "accepted the second option 
and notified Tarkanian that he was to be `completely 
severed of any and all relations, formal or informal with the 
University's Intercollegiate athletic program during the 
period of the University's NCAA probation,' " Id., just as the 
NCAA wished. Thereafter Tarkanian filed suit under 42 
U.S.C. S 1983 against the UNLV arguing that its actions 
had deprived him of property and liberty without due 
process of law. He brought a second civil rights action 
against the NCAA. The two suits were consolidated on 
appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court concluded that 
Tarkanian had no cause of action against the NCAA under 
S 1983 because the alleged deprivations did not arise from 
state action as required for liability under S 1983. The 
Court stated: 
 
       it was UNLV, the state entity, that actually suspended 
       Tarkanian. Thus the question is not whether UNLV 
       participated to a critical extent in the NCAA's activities, 
       but whether UNLV's actions in compliance with the 
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       NCAA rules and recommendations turned the NCAA's 
       conduct into state action. 
 
Id. at 193. The Court held that it did not because "the 
source of the legislation adopted by the NCAA is not Nevada 
but the collective membership, speaking through an 
organization that is independent of any particular state." Id. 
The Court noted that the NCAA might still be a state actor 
if "UNLV, by embracing the NCAA's rules, transformed them 
into state rules and the NCAA into a state actor." Id. 
However, the Court concluded that the nexus between 
UNLV and the NCAA was not sufficient to cloak the NCAA 
with the state authority vested in the University. 
 
Contrary to being an agent of the state, the NCAA had 
acted in opposition to, rather than in compliance with, the 
wishes of the state agency. "During the several years that 
the NCAA investigated the alleged violations, the NCAA and 
UNLV acted more like adversaries than like partners . . .". 
Id. at 196. Here, the majority concludes that "the Supreme 
Court's decision in NCAA v Tarkanian, is instructive, as 
that case makes clear that the NCAA does not `control' its 
members." Maj. Op. at 8. However, Tarkanian proves the 
reverse. The issue there was not whether the NCAA 
controlled its members, but whether a state institution that 
was a member of the NCAA controlled that organization to 
the point of transforming the NCAA into a state actor. My 
colleagues therefore look at Tarkanian through the wrong 
end of the telescope. We are not focused upon a university's 
control of the NCAA. Rather, we must focus upon the 
NCAA's control of the colleges and universities that 
comprise its membership. Tarkanian is compelling support 
for the plaintiffs' argument that the NCAA does exercise 
sufficient control over members' intercollegiate athletic 
programs to subject it to Title VI. The fact that UNLV was 
coerced into accepting the only viable option among the 
three choices left it by the NCAA's ultimatum in that case 
demonstrates just how much control the NCAA has over 
member institutions' athletic programs. Although that 
control may not be as great outside of Division I, the 
control certainly seems pervasive insofar as those schools 
that are subject to Proposition 16 are concerned. 
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Of course, I realize that the Court in Tarkanian  
recognized that "UNLV could have retained its coach and 
risked additional sanctions, perhaps even expulsion from 
the NCAA, or it could have withdrawn voluntarily from the 
Association," Id. It should come as no great surprise that it 
did neither. That is consistent with the Court's conclusion 
that the NCAA was not a state actor. However, it is also 
consistent with, and I think illustrative of, the NCAA's near 
total control of its members insofar as the amenities that 
are tethered to Division I athletic dominance in a "money 
sport" like college basketball. UNLV knew it had an 
alternative to suspending Tarkanian. The University clearly 
did not want to suspend him. The University thought that 
doing so was unjust and unjustifiable. Yet, Tarkanian was 
suspended just as the NCAA had commanded. The 
Supreme Court expressed skepticism over whether those 
circumstances established the NCAA's state authority, but 
the Court clearly entertained the possibility that those 
circumstances established the NCAA's control of UNLV's 
athletic program. 
 
       Tarkanian argues that the power of the NCAA is so 
       great that the UNLV had no practical alternative to 
       compliance with its demands. We are not at all sure 
       this is true, but even if we assume that a private 
       monopolist can impose its will on a state agency by a 
       threatened refusal to deal with it, it does not follow 
       that such a private party is therefore acting under 
       color of state law. 
 
        In the final analysis the question is whether the 
       conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal 
       right [can] be fairly attributable to the State. It would 
       be ironic indeed to conclude that the NCAA's imposition 
       of sanctions against UNLV -- sanctions that UNLV and 
       its counsel including the Attorney General of Nevada, 
       steadfastly opposed during protracted adversary 
       proceedings -- is fairly attributable to the State of 
       Nevada. It would be more appropriate to conclude that 
       UNLV has conducted its athletic program under color of 
       the policies adopted by the NCAA, rather than that 
       those policies were developed and enforced under color 
       of Nevada law. 
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Id. at 199. (emphasis added). 
 
Therefore, I believe a fact finder could reasonably 
conclude that the member institutions have ceded control 
over their intercollegiate programs to the NCAA, and this 
could subject the organization to Title VI. However, even if 
the NCAA is not a controlling authority, I think a 
reasonable inference could be drawn that the Fund is the 
alter ego of the NCAA, and therefore the latter is actually a 
recipient of Federal assistance under Title VI. 
 
B. The NCAA's Control Over the Fund 
 
It is undisputed that the NCAA created the Fund in an 
attempt to insulate itself from being considered a recipient 
of Federal assistance. Frank Marshall, the NCAA's Group 
Executive Director for Finance and Business Services and 
the Secretary/Treasurer of the Fund, testified at his 
deposition as follows: 
 
       Over time the NCAA has wanted to insure that it is not 
       a recipient or a contractor of the federal government 
       and has tried to manage the NYSP program in 
       accordance with that. The NYSP Fund I believe was 
       created to be the grant recipient related to the NYSP 
       grant to help insure that distinction. 
 
App. at 147a. 
 
That motivation is not, by itself, a justification for viewing 
the NCAA and the Fund as a single entity. However, I think 
that a genuine question remains as to whether the Fund 
has an existence separate and apart from the NCAA. 
 
1. Arguments in favor of the Fund as alter ego 
 
Plaintiffs argue the following to support their claim that 
the Fund has no separate existence and is, therefore, the 
alter ego of the NCAA: 
 
- Pursuant to the Funds' byla ws, the Funds' Board of 
Directors is composed solely of high-level NCAA employees 
and the chair of the NCAA's NYSP Committee. 
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- All of the decisions regard ing the NYSP Fund's 
operations and use of federal funds are made by the 
NCAA's NYSP Committee. 
 
- The NCAA's NYSP Committee h as final approval over 
which colleges and universities may participate in the NYSP 
as subgrantees and over which schools may continue to 
participate in the program. 
 
- The NCAA performs all of th e NYSP's administrative 
services, pursuant to a contract, for annual consideration 
of one dollar. 
 
- The administrative services  include handling the receipt 
and the disbursement of the federal grant money through 
a bank account that bears the name, "The National 
Collegiate Athletic Association -- The National Youth Sports 
Program." 
 
- Upon dissolution of the Fun d, all of the Funds' assets 
are to be transferred to the NCAA. 
 
- The Fund does not observe s tandard corporate 
formalities. It has no offices, no employees and no 
letterhead. It has never had a Board of Directors meeting 
nor has the Fund performed anything other than 
ministerial functions since its inception. 
 
- In 1993, the NCAA prepared and submitted form 
guidelines to HHS on the Fund's behalf, which identified 
the NCAA and not the Fund as the grantee. The guidelines 
specified that the NCAA was responsible for the program's 
direction and control. 
 
- Four years after the Fund b ecame the named grantee, 
HHS issued a press release identifying the NCAA as 
recipient of the annual grant to operate the NYSP. 
 
- In 1994, The Department of Health and Human 
Service's Office of Civil Rights investigated allegations that 
the NCAA engaged in discrimination in violation of Title IX 
based on HHS' determination that the NCAA was the 
recipient of federal funds. 
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2. Arguments Against Viewing the Fund 
       as an Alter Ego. 
 
The NCAA disagrees. It argues that it successfully created 
the Fund as a separate entity, and that there was nothing 
wrong with doing so. In support of its assertion that the 
Fund is a separate entity the NCAA submits: 
 
- All of the federal funds re ceived by the Fund are sub- 
granted to third parties, and none have ever been diverted 
to or for the benefit of the NCAA. 
 
- Since its creation, the NYS P Fund has remained 
separate and distinct from the NCAA and the Fund's 
separate and distinct character is evidenced by the fact that 
the Fund contracts with third parties for services, 
maintains its own insurance5 and Federal Employee 
Identification Number ("E.I.N."), and has been sued in its 
own name. In addition, the Fund's fiscal year runs from 
June 1 through May 31, while the NCAA's fiscal year runs 
from September 1 through August 31. 
 
- The Fund pays individuals t o perform evaluations of 
the program. 
 
- The NCAA only provides free  administrative services to 
the Fund pursuant to a written contract. 
 
- Although the NYSP Committee  was created by the 
NCAA and although the NYSP Committee makes final 
determinations with respect to the disposition of funds, the 
NYSP Committee is not controlled by the NCAA. According 
to the NCAA, the NYSP Committee has no NCAA employees. 
Rather, it is composed of representatives from five 
participating NYSP institutions and three ex-officio 
members, including two representatives from the federal 
government. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. This assertion is not entirely true. Although the Fund has been the 
named recipient of federal funds since 1992, the named insured on the 
insurance policies has not always been the Fund. From June 1, 1992 to 
June 1, 1994, the named insured was "National Collegiate Athletic 
Association d/b/a National Youth Sports Program." It is only from June 
1, 1994, that the named insured has been "National Youth Sports 
Program Fund." 
 
                                35 
  
- In 1989, the Department of Education's Office of Civil 
Rights declined to investigate an allegation that Proposition 
48 discriminated against students with learning disabilities 
in violation of S 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 based 
on its determination that the NCAA was not a recipient of 
federal funds. 
 
3. More Than One Inference Can Be Drawn From 
       Undisputed Facts. 
 
Of course, this matter is before us on appeal from the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment. The parties 
did agree at oral argument that there are no genuine issues 
of disputed material fact. Nevertheless, unlike my 
colleagues, I do not think that the purported absence of 
disputed facts necessarily warrants a grant of summary 
judgment because the undisputed facts allow for more than 
one interpretation of the relationship of the Fund to the 
NCAA. Thus, I believe that summary judgment to either 
party is inappropriate. See Nathanson v. Medical College of 
Pennsylvania, 926 F.2d 1368, 1380 (3d Cir. 1991) 
("Summary judgment may not be granted . . . if there is a 
disagreement over what inferences can be reasonably 
drawn from the facts even if the facts are undisputed."). 
 
The conflict between Rule 6.01.1, on the one hand, and 
Rules 1.2(b) and 2.1.1, on the other hand viewed in context 
with the realities of the importance of NCAA membership to 
Division I schools places the issue of the NCAA's control of 
member institutions into a posture that can only be 
resolved by a trier of fact. Similarly, issues remain as to 
whether the Fund is an alter ego of the NCAA. For example, 
both parties here rely on the undisputed fact that the NCAA 
provides administrative services to the Fund for a nominal 
yearly fee as support for their completely opposite 
conclusions. Similarly, it is undisputed that the Fund's 
Board of Directors is composed of high-level NCAA 
employees, that the NYSP Committee is a NCAA committee, 
and that the NYSP Committee makes final determinations 
with respect to the disposition of the HHS grant. However, 
it is also undisputed that no NCAA employees are members 
of the NYSP Committee. Rather, the NYSP Committee is 
comprised of representatives from five participating NYSP 
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institutions and three ex-officio members, including two 
representatives from the federal government. I believe that 
more than one conclusion can reasonably be drawn from 
the undisputed facts. Consequently, I believe that the 
matter should be remanded for trial. 
 
III. Limitations Imposed Under The Spending Clause 
 
If the NCAA is found to be a controlling authority of its 
members, the NCAA may still not be subject to Title VI. As 
the majority correctly notes, Title VI is Spending Clause 
legislation. Maj. Op. at 20. Title VI's character as a "typical 
`contractual' spending power provision," Guardians Ass'n v. 
Civil Service Comm'n, 463 U. S. 582, 599 (1985), raises a 
crucial question that was not addressed by the District 
Court. The majority claims that there is "no contractual 
privity between the Departments of Health and Human 
Services and Education and the NCAA with respect to 
Federal financial assistance to NCAA members." Maj. Op. at 
20. However, I do not think we can jump to that conclusion 
without a proper privity analysis, and the District Court 
never conducted one. Moreover, if a fact finder concludes 
that the Fund is merely an alter ego of the NCAA, the 
privity hurdle may be cleared.6 Similarly, if member 
institutions have ceded control of their programs to the 
NCAA, one could logically conclude that Congress intended 
to include the NCAA (as the authority actually controlling 
the programs receiving the Federal assistance) within the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Under the traditional application of the alter ego doctrine, corporate 
form may be disregarded when the corporation is "the mere 
instrumentality or business conduit of another corporation or person." 1 
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORP. S 41.10(perm. ed. rev. vol. 1999). 
 
"The effect of applying the alter ego doctrine . . . is that the 
corporation 
and the person who dominates it are treated as one person, so that any 
act committed by one is attributed to both, and if either is bound, by 
contract, judgment or otherwise, both are equally bound. . . ." Dudley v. 
Smith, 504 F.2d 979, 982 (5th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added). Thus, I believe it is an open question as to whether the program- 
specific limitation of the regulations can reach the NCAA if the Fund is 
truly its alter ego and was established solely to provide interference for 
an end run around Title VI. See Maj. Op. at 17.  
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contractual obligations required of a grantee under Title VI.7 
I do not think that Congress intended to enter into 
contractual obligations with colleges and universities in 
return for giving Federal assistance, and then allow those 
same institutions to keep the assistance while evading their 
contractual obligations by turning control of their 
intercollegiate athletics over to a purported insulated third 
party. 
 
I agree that Spending Clause jurisprudence dictates that 
we should be "circumspect in imposing Title VI obligations 
on an entity which is not a direct recipient of Federal 
financial assistance." Maj. Op. at 20. However, that does 
not preclude our requiring the District Court to undertake 
a privity analysis after resolution of the competing 
inferences arising from the undisputed facts to determine 
whether the NCAA's own conduct or structure subjects it 
the restrictions of Title VI. Moreover, if the Fund is merely 
the alter ego of the NCAA the latter may be the recipient, 
and we ought not treat the Fund as a separate entity. 
Accordingly, I conclude that the only appropriate course 
here is to reverse the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment, and remand the matter for trial. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the 
majority opinion and would, instead, remand for resolution 
of the competing inferences that can arise from the 
undisputed facts. Once the inferences are drawn, a proper 
analysis of the NCAA's privity of contract under the 
Spending Clause can proceed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In Paralyzed Veterans of Am, when considering the application of the 
Spending Clause to the limitations imposed upon recipients of Federal 
assistance under S 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court 
stated: "[b]y limiting coverage to recipients, Congress imposes the 
obligations of S 504 upon those who are in a position to accept or reject 
those obligations as a part of the decision whether or not to `receive' 
federal funds." Id. at 606. 
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